Exits: M&A, IPO and Public Markets
Thoma Bravo took SailPoint private in 2022 for $6.9B, ran it through a private hold, and priced its re-IPO on Feb 12, 2025 at $23.00/share (first trade Feb 13, Nasdaq: SAIL) — a ~$12.8B market value, raising ~$1.38B (SailPoint, Bloomberg). The return was not a single multiple but a route choice: buy at a public discount, improve privately, and exit back into the public market when the identity narrative and the IPO window aligned. The same asset can be worth materially different amounts in the private, strategic and public markets at the same instant, and the exit decision is a matter of selling into whichever one is paying most.
Exit into the highest-priced market
The three pricing regimes — public, private, M&A — rarely agree (Valuation). A sponsor or founder exits into whichever regime is paying the most for their asset at that moment, net of the certainty and cost of getting there. That makes exit selection a live, market-timing decision rather than a fixed plan:
- When strategic appetite is hot and platforms are consolidating (03m), the strategic sale pays the synergy/control premium and is usually the highest and most certain route.
- When the public window is open and growth is rewarded, an IPO (or re-IPO) can beat a strategic bid — and gives existing holders a liquid currency rather than a single check.
- When both are shut — a frozen IPO market, thin strategic demand — sponsors turn to secondary buyouts and continuation vehicles to manufacture liquidity without a true exit.
Not exiting — the option value of independence. Before the five routes sits another option: not selling. Staying independent is a priced call option on a higher bid later, paid for with the risk that the window closes or the category gets bundled away. Wiz is the canonical case: it rejected Alphabet's reported ~$23B (Jul 2024), pushed toward $1B ARR and an IPO, then agreed to sell to the same acquirer for $32B (announced Mar 2025, completed Mar 11 2026) — a ~39% step-up for the patience. The lesson is not "always hold out" (survivorship bias); a less-scarce asset that declines a fair bid often watches its category consolidate around it and sells later for less. The option is worth its risk only with durable hypergrowth, undisputed category ownership, a balance sheet that funds the wait, and scarcity the next buyer cannot manufacture elsewhere. When those hold, independence can be the highest-EV route; when they do not, selling into scarcity remains the base case. Most companies are not Wiz. (Mirrors Book Ch 15; see Buy-Side Prospect Framework for the inverse read on when an asset becomes gettable.)
The five routes, compared
| Route | Who buys | Pays | Certainty / speed | When it wins |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Strategic sale | A platform/vendor (03), occasionally a CVC (08) | Highest — control + synergy premium | High; one counterparty, fast once agreed | Hot consolidation; asset fills a named suite gap |
| Secondary buyout | Another sponsor (06c) | Market private multiple; no synergy premium | High; sponsor-to-sponsor processes are efficient | Public window shut; asset has more value-creation runway for a new owner |
| IPO | Public-market investors | Public multiple; episodic, window-dependent | Low/variable — needs an open window; pricing risk | Open window + growth story; founders/VCs want a liquid currency |
| Re-IPO | Public markets, after a private hold | Public multiple on an improved asset | Low/variable | The take-private round-trip completes (SailPoint) |
| Continuation vehicle (CV) | A new fund (often same GP) + secondary LPs | Negotiated NAV; no control/synergy premium | High; increasingly standardized | Hold a "trophy" asset past fund life; return capital to old LPs |
Two structures sit across these: a dual-track runs an IPO and a sale simultaneously to discover which market pays more (and to keep a strategic honest with the threat of a public listing); and the SPAC, the 2020–21 fad, is now largely a post-mortem route used only when conventional ones are closed.
The IPO window is a regime, not a date
The single most important fact about the IPO route is that it is episodic — it opens and shuts with the macro, and a cyber company cannot will a closed window open:
- 2021 — wide open; SentinelOne and others listed into a euphoric market at multiples that did not survive.
- 2022–2023 — effectively shut; almost no cyber IPOs; sponsors held assets past their horizon.
- 2024 — a crack: Rubrik listed Apr 24–25, 2024 on the NYSE (RBRK) at $32/share, ~$5.6B valuation, raising ~$752M (CNBC) — a single high-quality name testing the water.
- 2025 — a genuine reopening: ~24 tech IPOs overall, with two marquee cyber listings — SailPoint (re-IPO, priced Feb 12 2025, $23, ~$12.8B, Nasdaq: SAIL) and Netskope (priced Sep 17 2025 at $19/share, ~$7.3B valuation, ~$908M raised, ticker NTSK; first trade Sep 18 popped ~18% to an ~$8.8B close) (CNBC pricing, CNBC debut Sep 18 2025).
- 2026 — the window is widely expected to stay open, with a deep PE-backed backlog under pressure to return capital; named cyber candidates discussed in the pipeline include Cohesity (data security, ~$7–8B est.), Veeam, Cybereason (~$3B est.), Aqua Security, Orca Security, and (pre its partial sale to Accenture) Dragos (Strategy of Security, IPO pipeline). (Pipeline names are reported candidates, not confirmed filings; timing is window-dependent.)
The lesson for a sponsor: the IPO is a route available only when the market allows it. That asymmetry is why the strategic sale remains the base case and why continuation vehicles expanded when the window was shut.
The continuation vehicle
When neither public nor strategic markets clear an asset at an acceptable price, sponsors increasingly sell the asset to themselves: a new fund (often the same GP, with new secondary-market LPs) buys the company at a negotiated NAV, giving old LPs liquidity and the GP more time on a prized asset. CVs became a recognized fourth exit route — roughly 16% of sponsor exit volume in Q3 2025 (up ~70% YoY), against a secondaries market of ~$226B in 2025 (Hold Periods & Exit Timing). For cyber specifically, the CV is how a Thoma Bravo or Vista holds a category-leading platform past a fund's life rather than dumping it into a thin market — the structural answer to the DPI-pressure problem (06i).
Why the route choice matters for M&A advisory
The exit decision sets the buyer universe and the process design. A strategic sale means building a list of platforms that need the capability (03/08) and selling synergy; an IPO means an equity story, public comps (12a) and a banking syndicate; a secondary means a sponsor list and a clean equity story for a financial buyer. The dual-track exists precisely because the highest-value route is not knowable in advance — running both discovers the price and disciplines the strategic bidder with a credible alternative.
→ Cross-references: Deal Structures & Exits, Deal Structures, M&A Deals & Comps, Valuation, Public Trading Comps, Private Equity, Value-Creation Case: SailPoint, Hold Periods & Exit Timing, Fund Structures & LP Dynamics, Venture Capital, Bear Case & Disruption.
Sources — SailPoint re-IPO ($6.9B take-private 2022; priced Feb 12 2025 at $23, first trade Feb 13, Nasdaq: SAIL, ~$12.8B, ~$1.38B raised): SailPoint pricing PR, Bloomberg, Feb 13 2025; Netskope IPO (priced Sep 17 2025 at $19, ~$7.3B, ~$908M, NTSK): CNBC, Sep 17 2025; Rubrik IPO (Apr 24–25 2024, $32, ~$5.6B, ~$752M, RBRK): CNBC, Apr 24 2024; 2026 pipeline candidates: Strategy of Security; CV/secondaries figures per 06h. IPO dates labeled priced/listed; pipeline names tagged as reported candidates, not confirmed filings.
Updated 2026-08-16 18:13 UTC · © El Dorado Capital · el-doradocapital.com · Market intelligence for informational purposes only; not investment advice.